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Abstract
Android continues to dominate the mobile operating
system market and remains the most popular choice
amongst smartphone users. Consequently, Android
remains an attractive target for malware authors and
as such, the mobile platform is still highly prone to
infections caused by malicious applications. To tackle
this problem, malware classifiers leveraging machine
learning techniques have been proposed, with varying
degrees of success. In fact, it can be observed that
for machine learning models to produce good results,
they often need to rely on a large, diverse set of fea-
tures – which are indicative of apps installed by users.
This, in turn, raises privacy concerns as it has been
shown that features used to train and test machine
learning models can provide insights into user’s pref-
erences. As such, there is a need for a decentralized,
privacy-respecting Android malware classifier which
can protect users from both malware infections and
the misuse of private, sensitive information stored on
their mobile devices.
To fill this gap, we propose LiM – a malware clas-
sification framework which leverages the power of
Federated Learning to detect and classify malicious
apps in a privacy-respecting manner. Data about
newly installed apps is kept locally on the users’ de-
vices while users benefit from the learning process
from each other, and the service provider cannot in-
fer which apps were installed by each user. To re-
alize such classifier in a setting where users cannot
provide ground truth (i.e. they cannot tell whether
an app is malicious), we use a safe semi-supervised
ensemble that maximizes the increase on classifica-
tion accuracy with respect to a baseline classifier the
service provider trains. We implement LiM and show
that the cloud has F1 score of 95%, while clients have
perfect recall with only 1 false positive in ¿100 apps,
using a dataset of 25K clean apps and 25K malicious
apps, 200 users and 50 rounds of federation. Fur-
thermore, we also conducted a security analysis to
demonstrate that LiM remains robust against poi-
soning attacks.
1 Introduction
In 2019, Google reported that there are 2.5 billion
active Android devices [7] – almost a decade after its
first launch. Google’s popular mobile operating sys-
tem (OS), Android, is expected to continue to hold
a tight grip on the mobile market share for the years
to come [8]. This phenomenon, however, comes at
a cost. Since its release, Android has been known to
be an attractive, sought-after target for malware pro-
liferation, and unfortunately, this still holds true till
date [33]. Additionally, the fact that Android appli-
cations (apps) can be installed from both the official
app store, i.e. Google Play and third-party stores,
and the plethora of device manufacturers involved
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make it challenging to deploy security measures that
can scale easily.
The Android research community has worked to-
wards novel solutions to thwart malware propagation.
This effort has always been a constant, on-going arms
race. One common approach that has proven quite
successful so far is the application of machine learn-
ing (ML) algorithms for malware detection and clas-
sification. ML solutions can be grouped under the
following three categories: (i) cloud-based, (ii) client-
based and (iii) hybrid, i.e. a combination of (i) and
(ii). In cloud-based solutions [29, 40], the ML models
are supplied with large sets of features that implic-
itly reveal users’ app preferences which can then be
leveraged to conduct targeted advertising. While for
client-based solutions [3], the ML models are known
to compute predictions on the device itself; this ap-
proach is often resource consuming and results in
high false positives as the models are not learning
about new data as time goes by. Lastly, hybrid so-
lutions [34, 4] provide users with more flexibility as
apps that are flagged as suspicious on the device can
be pushed to the cloud for further analysis.
In general, it cannot be denied that ML algorithms
are effective at detecting malware. However, of no-
table concern, is the amount of information required
for the ML models to produce good results and the
associated repercussions on user’s privacy. More con-
cretely, for the models to produce reasonable detec-
tion accuracies, it can be observed that the higher
the number of raw features available for training and
testing, the better are the results. Unfortunately, as
demonstrated by Song et al. [35], ML models are ca-
pable of memorizing and leaking detailed informa-
tion about datasets. This observation coupled with
the fact that apps installed on a mobile device are
highly representative of a user’s behavior, including
their personal preferences, political views, etc. pose
a huge threat to user’s privacy.
Motivation In 2017, Google introduced Google Play
Protect [2], a service that Google uses to scan apps
installed on Android users’ phones. A year later, the
company published further details about the inner-
workings of Google Play Protect [36, 24], which in-
cludes application of machine learning techniques at
scale, and using app and Google Play data as data
sources. It was also then revealed that Google not
only detects malicious apps installed from the Google
Play store, but also from third-party stores. There
are several privacy implications with Google’s ap-
proach due to the insights that can be derived from
the vast amount of information Google can poten-
tially learn about apps that have been installed both
from the official and third-party app stores. This
also bring forth the argument of free market and
whether Google should hold such power over its An-
droid users.
Therefore, to address the aforementioned concerns
and shortcomings, we investigate the following key
question: How can we build a decentralized Android
malware classifier that is privacy-respecting?
In this paper, we present LiM – a framework that
leverages the power of Federated Learning (FL) to
(i) decentralize a malware classifier, and (ii) respect
users’ privacy. State of the art FL models [39, 38, 27]
allow users to keep their testing data locally while the
learning process is done collaboratively to improve
performance, i.e. users train their client models by
providing ground truth on the delivered predictions,
while a service provider aggregates the parameters of
all models. LiM extends the traditional FL technique
to the semi-supervised ML paradigm [12], enabling
the application of FL in settings where users cannot
provide ground truth, as is the case with correctly
recognizing malicious apps. Semi-supervised models
allow us to use both the labeled data of the cloud and
the unlabeled data of the clients; the former trains
fully supervised models and shares them with clients
to be retrained with their testing data.
We validate the design by implementing LiM and
measured its performance and its resilience against
poisoning attacks. We carry out experiments using
a dataset of 25K malware apps and 25K clean apps,
simulating federations of 200 clients over 50 rounds.
The results show that the cloud can reach 95% F1
score, and clients has as few as 1 false positive. Ad-
ditionally, if faced with a strategic adversary whose
goal is to perform a poisoning attack by controlling
50% of the clients, LiM showed that the remaining
honest clients are successfully able to correctly iden-
tify the targeted, poisoned app. Thus, defeating the
attack and ensuring that the global model’s predic-
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tions do not get affected.
Our contributions:
1. We present a first, comprehensive design and
implementation of a privacy-respecting Android
malware classifier.
2. We demonstrate an effective way to combine
Federated Learning and semi-supervised ensem-
ble learning to enhance malware detection accu-
racy and privacy at the same time.
3. We conduct a security analysis to illustrate the
robustness of LiM against poisoning attacks.
4. In the spirit of open science, we make our code
available at redacted for review.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in sec-
tion 2, we provide background knowledge about Fed-
erated Learning, semi-supervised learning and An-
droid malware classification. Section 3 describes the
threat model of LiM and in section 4, we elaborate on
safe semi-supervised Federated Learning and how it
is implemented in LiM. Section 5 provides the details
of the LiM architecture and its associated building
blocks, followed by the empirical results and security
analysis in section 6. Section 7 presents a discussion
based on the empirical results and avenues for future
work together with key related work in section 8 and
concluding remarks in section 9.
2 Background
2.1 Federated Learning
Federated Learning (also referred to as collaborative
learning) is a technique that allows a machine learn-
ing algorithm to be trained in a distributed setting
using a client-server architecture. Clients (i.e. mo-
bile devices) train their own local models and send
the resulting parameters to the cloud. In turn, the
cloud aggregates the received parameters and pushes
them back to the clients so that they can improve
their performance. Thus, the cloud service provider
does not have access to the raw client data, which is
kept secret by the clients.
One way to set up an FL-based system is to dis-
tribute the architecture of a supervised classifier (typ-
ically a deep neural network) to clients, which then
train them using labels provided by their own users
[15]. The weights of the network are then aggregated
by the cloud by taking their average and pushed back
to the clients so that further iterations of local train-
ing can improve upon them.
A limitation of vanilla FL is that clients need to
provide ground truth to train the local classifiers [12].
While applications such as predictive typing can ben-
efit from this approach (since users know what they
want to write), others, for e.g. malware classification
cannot. We propose a solution to this problem using
safe semi-supervised learning algorithms.
2.2 Safe semi-supervised learning
Semi-supervised learning (SSL) aims to use unlabeled
information together with a labeled dataset to train a
classifier. SSL algorithms exploit the fact that label-
ing data can be difficult and expensive, while collect-
ing and learning labels from raw data has become eas-
ier with the commoditization of internet access and
the plethora of apps installed on smartphones. One
of the main challenges for the success of an SSL algo-
rithm is to ensure it indeed learns useful information
from unlabeled samples, as there is no ground truth
for the algorithm to compare its predictions with.
Safe SSL addresses this challenge by assuring that
a minimal baseline performance is always achieved,
i.e. that unlabeled information does not worsen the
performance of another (possibly fully supervised)
classifier. A well-performing strategy to achieve safe
SSL is to use an ensemble of learners that, combined
through a set of learned weights, are likely to outper-
form the baseline model [18, 17].
An example of this kind of classifier is SAFEW [17].
Its goal is to maximize the worst-case performance
gain of a set of base learner (i.e. base classifier), with
respect to the baseline classifier, assuming the correct
prediction can be realized by the convex combination
of the base learners [17]. The learning task is to find
their associated weights by solving a minimization
problem whose constraints can embed prior knowl-
edge. Equation 1 shows the formal description of the
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problem. Given a set of n base learners and a baseline
prediction y0, find a set of weights αi for base learner
predictions yi such that performance with respect
to final predictions l(y,
∑n
i=1 αiyi) is better than
with respect to baseline prediction l(y0,
∑n
i=1 αiyi)
as measured by loss function l. For this guarantee
to hold in a worst case scenario, we use a maximin
formulation:
• maximize over the final predictions: maxy∈Hu
• the worse case performance gain:
minα∈M l(y0,
∑n
i=1 αiyi)− l(y,
∑n
i=1 αiyi)
where H = {−1,+1}, u is the number of unlabeled
samples, and M is a convex set from which weights
are drawn. M can be tuned using domain knowledge,
although it is not necessary.
max
y∈Hu
min
α∈M
l(y0,
n∑
i=1
αiyi)− l(y,
n∑
i=1
αiyi) (1)
2.3 Android
2.3.1 Android manifest file
In the Android operating system (OS), apps are dis-
tributed as Android application package (APK) files.
These files are simple archives which contain byte-
code, resources and metadata. A user can install or
uninstall an app (thus the APK file) by directly in-
teracting with the smartphone. When an Android
app is running, its code is executed in a sandbox. In
practice, an app runs isolated from the rest of the sys-
tem, and it cannot directly access other apps’ data.
The only way an app can gain access is via the media-
tion of inter-process communication techniques made
available by Android. These measures are in place to
prevent the access of malicious apps to other apps’
data, which could potentially be privacy-sensitive.
Since Android apps run in a sandbox, they not
only have restriction in shared memory usage, but
also to most system resources. Instead, the Android
OS provides an extensive set of Accessible Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs), which allows access to system
resources and services. In particular, the APIs that
give access to potentially privacy-violating services
(e.g., camera, microphone) or sensitive data (e.g.,
contacts) are protected by the Android Permission
System [10]. Developers have to explicitly mention
the permissions, that require user’s approval, in the
AndroidManifest.xml file (hereon referred to as the
Manifest file).
Besides permissions, the Manifest file also includes
information about the app components [11] , such
as activities, services, broadcast receivers and con-
tent providers. An activity is the representation of a
single screen that handles interactions between user
and apps. Services are components that run in the
background of the operating system to perform long-
running operations while a different application is
running in the foreground. Broadcast receivers re-
spond to broadcast messages from other applications
or the system. They allow an app to respond to
broadcast announcements outside of a regular user
flow. A content provider manages a shared set of
app data and stores them in the file system. It also
supplies data from one app to another on request.
It is worth noting that the information present in a
Manifest file is not obfuscated and can be extracted
via static analysis. It is to the app developer’s best
interest to not obfuscate the file as it would result in
breaking the functionalities of the app, and therefore,
rendering it useless. In section 6, we provide further
details about the features used by our proposed clas-
sifier, LiM, to conduct malware detection.
2.3.2 Android malware classification
There are several proposals for machine learning clas-
sifiers that can detect malicious APKs targeting An-
droid. We divide them in three categories: central-
ized, local and hybrid.
Centralized approaches use a cloud classifier to pre-
dict if an app is malicious or clean. Cloud-based ap-
proaches can accurately predict big testing datasets
thanks to the advance feature engineering a cloud
infrastructure can handle [29]. Both static and dy-
namic analysis can be performed, for e.g. such as
taking into account the API call graphs of the apps
and behavioral characteristics of an app during exe-
cution.
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Local approaches install an already trained clas-
sifier on the user’s device. Due to the constrained
resources available to the classifier, the feature set
and the detection algorithm must be considerably
more lightweight than in centralized approaches [3].
Lightweight dynamic analysis can be performed to-
gether with static analysis (for e.g. features from
Manifest file).
Hybrid approaches combine local and cloud mod-
els. A first screening of the app is performed on the
device itself using a lightweight feature set, and if
necessary more features are collected and sent to the
cloud to verify the prediction [34, 4].
Our proposal, LiM, aims to perform as well as cen-
tralized solutions and protect user information as per-
formed by malware detection approaches conducted
locally on the device, and thus, effectively combining
both approaches in a single prediction step.
3 Threat model
Inspired by [32], we describe the threat model of LiM
in terms of its attack surface, its trust model, the
capabilities of the adversary and his goals.
The aim of our proposed framework is to conduct
malware classification in a decentralized manner us-
ing learners that are trained with data that abides
by the data minimization principle. Therefore, in our
threat model we distinguish between two different ad-
versaries (referred to as Adversary 1 and Adversary
2 below) who have the following goals:
1. Compromise integrity: adversary is successful
at poisoning the federation rounds in order to
trigger specific apps to be misclassified, as pre-
sented in [5].
2. Compromise privacy: adversary is able to learn
privacy-sensitive information about the training
set of the user, as presented in [21].
Adversary 1 targets the core of the service pro-
vided by a malware classifier, i.e. bypass the detec-
tion mechanism of the system. His goal is to change
the model so that it misclassifies a specific malicious
application. In a federated setting, he can change the
model by disguising himself as a user of the system
and submitting specially crafted models to the fed-
eration. Further, we assume he has control over the
malicious application, and that it can be tweaked so
that the model is close to confusing it with a clean
app. In this scenario, as a trust model, we assume
that users trust their own devices and the service
provider.
Adversary 2 aims to compromise the privacy of the
user. To do so, he tries to learn information about
the apps that users have installed on their devices, for
e.g. the app names, categories, device usage patterns,
etc. In a federated setting, we are interested in a pas-
sive global attacker, as described in [28], that resides
at the service provider’s side and subsequently, infer
information about the training apps of the clients us-
ing the models that are uploaded to the cloud. In
this scenario, we assume that users only trust their
own devices.
Both adversaries have white-box access to the ser-
vice provider model (including architecture, feature
set and hyper-parameters) in each federation round.
Adversary 2 also has white-box access to the models
of all clients in each round, while adversary 1 does
not know the hyper-parameters of the honest users
models.
The attack surface can thus be interpreted as the
models of the clients participation in the federation.
We assume the data collected by the service provider
and the users has not been tampered with, and has
been pre-processed correctly.
4 Safe semi-supervised feder-
ated learning
In this section, we provide further details about how
the concept of FL can be extended to the semi-
supervised paradigm. In particular, we present our
arguments on how these two techniques are com-
plementary in providing us with the necessary tech-
nical building blocks to implement a decentralized,
privacy-respecting malware classifier.
Traditionally, FL employs a decentralized ap-
proach to train a neural model. Instead of upload-
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ing data to servers for centralized training, clients
aggregate their local data and share model updates
with the global server. Such distributed approach
has been shown to work with unbalanced datasets
and data that are not independent or identically dis-
tributed across clients. Furthermore, FL’s success is
dependent on properly labeled data which can then
be passed on to train supervised learning models.
For the purpose of our work, we cannot rely on
users assigning correct labels on the client’s side, as it
cannot be guaranteed that they will correctly identify
malicious apps. Therefore, we adopt semi-supervised
methods that allow federated learning to train lo-
cal models without user supervision. Labeled data
is kept by the service provider, and clients use their
unlabeled samples to update the parameters of their
semi-supervised model stored locally.
Furthermore, we leverage the practical benefits of
safe SSL, as described in section 2.2, to ensure that
models trained by the clients are useful, i.e. they do
not introduce confusion (via incorrect labels) in the
federation but provide at least a high enough baseline
performance.
In the case of LiM, the federation happens across
the weights of the base learners, which clients esti-
mate using their unlabeled testing datasets. The ser-
vice provider then collects all client weights and ag-
gregates them in a similar fashion as it would do with
the weights of e.g. a deep neural network (DNN). It
is important to note that the number of base learn-
ers is much lower than the number of neurons in a
DNN – LiM compresses client data even more, tak-
ing advantage of the training process that the service
provider performs on the base learners. We see this
feature as a defense mechanism against privacy at-
tacks (cf. section 3), as client updates will not be
sparse anymore.
Moreover, in our proposed architecture, the ser-
vice provider plays a greater role than in the clas-
sical, supervised FL in order to compensate for the
lack of ground truth in the clients. It also selects
the architecture and the feature sets of the differ-
ent learners, as well as which learner will be used as
baseline. Furthermore, LiM can provide protection
against integrity attacks (cf. section 3) by compar-
ing the weights of the clients with those generated
through its own unlabeled dataset.
Terminology. To improve readability of the remain-
ing sections, we provide the reader with our working
definition of key terminologies that we will rely on for
the rest of the paper.
• Client : ML model that resides locally on the
user’s mobile device
• Cloud : global ML model which is present at the
service provider’s side, i.e. a trusted entity
• SAFEW : an ensemble of classifiers
• Baseline learner : bare minimum performance
for an individual SAFEW classifier
• Base learner : individual algorithm that forms
the ensemble learning
5 LiM architecture
Initialization phase: We assume the service
provider has access to a ground truth (labeled)
dataset and testing (unlabled) dataset. On the
client’s side, we assume users want to scan their
installed apps (in a privacy-respecting manner) for
presence of malware. LiM can be incorporated in the
package installer of an Android OS and runs as priv-
ileged background service on each client’s phone.
To implement the scheme explained in section 4, we
apply the SAFEW classifier introduced in section 2.2.
Round 0 of FL: In the first step of the federation,
the cloud (i.e. service provider) trains a set of base-
line and base learners using its labeled dataset, and
estimates a set of weights for the base learners us-
ing its unlabeled data. In step 2, clients receive the
trained learners in order to (step 3) estimate their
own SAFEW weights using their own testing data
(i.e. their installed apps). Then clients use these
average weights to classify their installed apps (step
5). Users then complete their federation round by
sending their client weights to the cloud (step 6). To
aggregate them, the cloud first averages all the client
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weights (step 7) and finally compute the median be-
tween these averaged client weights and the weights
of its own SAFEW computed in step 1 (step 8). Fi-
nally, the cloud sends the federated weights to the
clients to initiate a new round of federation. This
process is depicted in figure 1.
Round 1 of FL (and beyond): Once Round 0 is
completed, the service provider has the option of re-
applying steps 1-2 at any point during the federation
rounds; however, we did not consider this in our ex-
perimental evaluation. Alternatively, after applying
step 3, using the cloud’s own weights, the client then
average them with its own weight, as depicted in step
4. Steps 5-9 are then applied as described in Round
0.
It is worth noting that in LiM the service provider
does not send its own weights in the initial round so
as not to mix-up with the client weights. In later
rounds, new federated weights are computed as us-
ing both clients’ and cloud’s weights. In order to
aggregate all client weights, we compute their aver-
age; then, the service provider computes the median
between the average client weights and its own. The
design and rationale behind this construction is very
conservative on purpose in order to counteract in-
tegrity attacks, critical for the performance of a de-
centralized malware classifier.
Moreover, the individual SAFEWs use the hinge
loss function to estimate their weights from unlabeled
data. While SAFEW supports different loss func-
tions, they also show that hinge loss allows SAFEW
to find the optimal prediction y using equation 2.
y = sign(
n∑
i=1
αiyi) (2)
where n is the number of base learners, yi the pre-
dictions of base learner i, and αi its weight.
We can also use different classifiers as SAFEW
learners, as the optimization algorithm only uses
their predictions to compute their weights. There
are two main criteria to keep in mind when selecting
alternative learners:
• They must provide a reasonable performance by
on their own, e.g. over 90% F1 score.
• Their predictions must complement each other,
i.e. the learners must be heterogeneous. If there
is one clearly strong learner, SAFEW will just
copy its predictions (i.e. its weight will be 1).
Additionally, domain knowledge can guide the
aforementioned selection process, and it is possible
to further constraint the set of possible weights M
(cf. section 2.2) to reflect for e.g. the confidence
that the designer has on each learner relative to each
other. It is, however, important to note that LiM
does not need a lot of domain information for its
setup. Weights can be learnt from data without any
domain knowledge, and there are no assumptions on
the distribution of the testing dataset (e.g. no prior
knowledge on the classes base rate).
In LiM, the service provider makes sure that the
SAFEW ensemble distributed to the clients can per-
form better than the baseline, then testing it with
its own labeled dataset and discarding those combi-
nations of learners whose F1 score is lower than the
baseline’s. In section 6 we compare the performance
of standard learners to decide which combination is
the most beneficial for malware detection.
6 Evaluation of the system
We empirically evaluate LiM as a federated malware
classifier by simulating 200 clients and a single ser-
vice provider for 50 federation rounds, running as a
parallelized (across clients) Python program on a 4
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU @ 3.30GHz cores
using 7.5 GiB of RAM. The goal is to show how
LiM performs using different configurations for the
individual SAFEWs, as well as its evolution across
rounds with respect to the different baseline learners
and local (i.e. non-federated) SAFEWs.
Specifically, we set up LiM to use the following
learners: k Nearest Neighbours with number of neigh-
bors n = 3 (kNN n3), Logistic Regression with regu-
larization parameter c = 1 (LR c1), Random Forests
with number of decision trees n=50 (RF n50), 100
(RF n100) and 200 (RF n200), and Linear SVM with
regularization parameter c = 1 (SVM c1). All learn-
ers are used in each experiment, rotating the baseline
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Figure 1: LiM architecture – the cloud and the clients all train their own SAFEW model, and weights are
aggregated twice to distribute the information of the testing datasets of the users.
role across them. Clients only use those configura-
tions that the cloud vetted as safe, i.e. where the
cloud SAFEW outperformed or matched the perfor-
mance of the baseline learner.
We perform 4 experiments per configuration using
the top 100, top 200 and top 500 features (i.e. 12 ex-
periments per configuration). Half of the simulations
are done with 50% of adversarial clients to evaluate
resilience against integrity attacks.
Section 6.1 describes the datasets we used, sec-
tion 6.2 summarizes the results of the performance
evaluation, and section 6.3 details the security anal-
ysis.
6.1 Datasets
We use the AndroZoo dataset [1] to obtain 25K clean
apps, which were selected from the top 3 most popu-
lar stores (Anzhi, Appchina and Google Play Store)
in the dataset as of October 2018. As for the malware
samples, we collected 25K samples from the Android
Malware Genome project [41] and the Android Mal-
ware Dataset project [37, 19]. We pick the latest
version of apps, removing duplicates within the same
store. It is possible that the same app is published in
two different stores as different versions, but we con-
sider they are effectively different apps as develop-
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Table 1: Number of features per category. In
the top 500, there are 55 features that belong
to two categories: 54 of them can be declared
as permissions or hardware components, the 55th
(com facebook facebookcontentprovider) can be ei-
ther an activity or a content provider.
100 200 500
declared permissions 65 73 97
activities 19 80 232
services 3 13 71
intent filters 0 0 0
content providers 1 3 10
broadcast receivers 6 25 85
hardware components 24 24 24
ers may include different functionality for particular
stores.
From each app we extract the manifest features
proposed in Drebin [3]. While dynamic analysis can
provide greater performance, it is both more resource
intensive and more easily obfuscated. We then trans-
form the statically extracted features into a vector of
binary values indicating the presence of a feature (e.g.
a specific permission) in the manifest of an app. Fi-
nally, we select the top 100, 200, and 500 out of 370K
features using the chi-squared (chi2) test, which mea-
sures the correlation between a given feature and the
class attribute. To summarize them, table 1 shows
how many features belong to each of the Drebin cat-
egories.
Out of the 50K apps, we randomly sample a train-
ing set of 10K apps for training (all models) and use
32K apps for testing the cloud and 8K to test the
clients, with a ˜1K overlap between testing sets.
We simulate several rounds of federation as de-
scribed in section 5. In the first round, clients have
a set of 96 preinstalled apps extracted from an An-
droid Pie emulator whose manifests have at least one
permission. In later rounds, the clients install up
to 5 apps drawn randomly from the client testing
dataset, using a binomial distribution with bias 0.6
to randomize the number of apps. Each app will be
a malware sample with probability 0.1. Moreover, to
model the fact that users install popular apps much
more frequently than others, we create two sets of 50
apps based on the presence of popular features in the
malware and clean datasets, and make clients draw
apps from these sets with probability 0.8.
6.2 Performance evaluation
6.2.1 Performance metrics
To make a fair evaluation of LiM in a setting where
users encounter many more clean apps than mali-
cious (i.e. where classes are highly imbalanced) we
use the F1 score, computed as F1 = 2 ∗ (precision ∗
recall)/(precision+ recall). Precision measures how
many positive predictions (true positives + false pos-
itives) were actual positives (true positives), while
recall measures how many actual positives (true pos-
itives + false negatives) were classified as positive
(true positives). Since users typically install many
more clean apps than malicious apps, it is easy for
LiM to achieve high recall by predicting many pos-
itives at the expense of precision, which is not ac-
counted for in other popular metrics like accuracy.
In order to better understand this balance between
precision and recall across SAFEW configurations,
we also report the raw number of false positives. End
users can be sensible to small differences in the num-
ber of false alarms, even if the F1 score of two ver-
sions of LiM using different configurations of learners
is very similar.
6.2.2 Performance results
Table 2 shows the F1 score and the number of false
positives (FP) of clients using different sets of base-
line and base learners, and averaged across experi-
ments. The best performance, i.e. F1 score of 77.4%
is achieved using kNN as baseline and 200 features,
thanks to the low number of false positives. Baseline
SVM also achieves high F1 score of 61% using 200
features.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of LiM using KNN
as baseline. The first round of the federation brings
a significant improvement in performance for LiM,
and then the F1 score slowly grows similarly to how
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Table 2: Comparison of client average performance across LiM, SAFEW, and different baselines. Experi-
ments are carried out for 50 rounds of federation using the top 100, top 200 and top 500 features as per the
chi2 test.
FP F1 (%)
Classifier Baseline LiM SAFEW Baseline LiM SAFEW
Baseline #Features
KNN n3 200 7 1 6 35.7 77.4 39.3
500 6 3 3 35.1 58.3 58.3
LR c1 100 5 5 5 43.0 45.8 43.5
200 3 2 2 57.1 66.3 66.3
500 4 4 4 46.7 46.3 47.8
RF n50 500 2 2 2. 58.4 62.2 60.2
SVM c1 100 5 3 4 44.7 55.8 53.1
200 3 3 6 53.7 61.0 46.5
500 4 3 3 53.3 61.1 61.1
SAFEW (i.e. no-lim) and baseline do. By round 50,
LiM reaches close to 80% F1 score.
Figure 2: F1 score of 200 clients with 200 features, us-
ing kNN (n=3) as base learner. SAFEW (i.e. no-lim)
improves on baseline, and LiM improves on SAFEW.
In figure 3, we can see how this performance gain
comes from the reduction of false positives. The evo-
lution shows that all clients keep the number of false
positives to 1, whereas baseline KNN and SAFEW
have some clients misclassify more clean apps as
rounds advance.
Figure 3: False positives of 200 clients with 200 fea-
tures, using kNN (n=3) as base learner. LiM reduces
the number of false positives to 1, while both SAFEW
(i.e. no-lim) and baseline see them grow from 6 and
7 up respectively.
Table 3 shows the same metrics for the cloud par-
ticipating in the federation of the previous clients. In
this table we also report results from a Centralized
SAFEW to estimate the performance when clients sub-
10
mit the feature vectors of their apps directly to the
cloud, i.e. when no privacy is provided. We can see
that LiM always matches the F1 score of the central-
ized SAFEW and that the number of false positives is
the lowest using kNN with 200 features, which is con-
sistent with the results of the clients. Regardless of
the configuration used, the F1 score remains around
96%.
As we discussed in section 5, we assume the
cloud SAFEW improves performance over its base-
line. Thus, table 2 does not show client performance
for most of the configurations where RFs are base-
lines, as table 3 shows that the F1 scores of the cloud
SAFEW in round 0 is lower than the F1 score of the
baselines.
6.2.3 Run-time performance
The cloud and the clients compute their LiM predic-
tions in 3 steps:
1. Build a local SAFEW. New weights are com-
puted using testing data.
2. Average local and federated weights
3. Compute new predictions using the new weights
For step 1, the cloud takes 13 seconds and an indi-
vidual client at the beginning of the federation spends
0.1 seconds. Step 2 cost is negligible. Step 3 however,
takes almost the same time as step 1: step 1 spends
only 1/10 of the time computing new weights, which
in step 3 is not necessary. Thus, clients spent 0.2 sec-
onds computing the LiM predictions, while the cloud
spent 26 seconds.
Note that the implementation was not optimized
at all: at the very minimum, the base predictions
from step 1 can be reused in step 3, making the total
time closer to the time of step 1.
Regarding the training of the base learners, we
observe each model taking 12.7s and the first cloud
SAFEW prediction spending 13 seconds.
6.3 Security analysis
In section 3 we considered two different adversaries:
one that aims to poison the federation in order to
make a specific malware app be classified as clean,
and another that wants to learn about the apps users
have installed.
Federated learning provides a defense mechanism
against privacy attacks. It hides the raw features of
the installed apps, making it more difficult for a ser-
vice provider to infer information about them. How-
ever, the submitted models may still leak information
that can be used to infer e.g. if a single app has been
used to train them [21]. The attack presented in [21]
relies on the fact that updates to the client mod-
els may change only a few of the model parameters,
i.e. which specific parameters can reveal information
about the apps used in that federation round.
In our setting, updates to client models only change
the weights of the base learners. It is safe to assume
that the number of base learners of SAFEW is sig-
nificantly smaller than the number of weights in e.g.
a deep neural network. As the information available
for the adversary to perform the membership infer-
ence is greatly reduced, we assume the probability of
success is low.
While the architecture of LiM can be seen as a mit-
igation against privacy attacks, the decentralization
of the training process directly affects, in a positive
manner, the integrity of the system. An adversary
can freely participate in the federation by owning
a subset of the clients, and subsequently having an
influence on the overall federation through his own
client models.
To analyze LiM’s resilience against this kind of at-
tacks, we focus on the impact a strategic adversary
has. We assume he controls over 50% of the clients,
which he uses to make LiM misclassify a specific
malware app from the client testing dataset (which
he can modify) as clean. To make this app unde-
tectable to LiM (i.e. a false negative), he will craft
the weights of his malicious clients so that his allied
base learners have an honest majority in the dif-
ferent layers of the federation. A base learner is an
ally of the adversary if it classifies the malware app
as clean. We assume there is at least one ally in the
LiM configuration.
We formalize the problem in equations 3 through 7.
Let w be the honest weights of a malicious client,
and w′ the poisoned weights. The adversary goal is
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Table 3: Comparison of cloud average performance across LiM, SAFEW, and different baselines. Experi-
ments are carried out for 50 rounds of federation using the top 100, top 200 and top 500 features as per the
chi2 test.
FP F1 (%)
Classifier Baseline Centralized SAFEW LiM SAFEW Baseline Centralized SAFEW LiM SAFEW
Baseline #Features
KNN n3 100 1008 978 979 978 94.7 94.4 94.4 94.4
200 1707 612 611 611 93.0 96.1 96.1 96.1
500 835 571 570 570 95.3 96.1 96.1 96.1
LR c1 100 1032 720 718 719 94.3 95.8 95.8 95.8
200 853 649 648 644 94.6 96.1 96.1 96.1
500 730 656 654 633 95.0 96.2 96.2 96.2
RF n100 100 667 736 736 736 95.8 95.7 95.7 95.7
200 604 647 647 647 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1
500 590 618 618 618 96.4 96.2 96.2 96.2
RF n200 100 663 755 755 755 95.8 95.7 95.7 95.7
200 590 658 658 658 96.2 96.1 96.1 96.1
500 579 589 589 589 96.4 96.2 96.2 96.2
RF n50 100 660 732 732 732 95.8 95.7 95.7 95.7
200 596 654 654 654 96.1 96.0 96.0 96.0
500 567 632 631 533 96.3 96.2 96.2 96.3
SVM c1 100 976 750 748 747 94.3 95.7 95.7 95.7
200 747 647 646 640 94.7 96.1 96.1 96.1
500 637 625 625 686 95.5 96.3 96.3 96.2
to make them as similar as possible, to be as stealthy
as possible. Equation 3 expresses this goal.
minimize
w′
‖w − w′‖ (3)
To maximize the chances of poisoning the federa-
tion, weights need to take into account multiple con-
straints. First, they must add up to one. Let b be the
number of base learners; then the first constraint to
the optimization problem is depicted in equation 4.
b∑
i=1
w′b = 1 (4)
Second, for the compromised client to misclassify
the targeted app, the weights of the classifiers that
err in favour of the adversary must account for an
honest majority. Let M be the indices of those allied
classifiers in the SAFEW ensemble; then equation 5
expresses the local constraint:
b∑
i=1
w′i > 0.5, {i | i ∈M} (5)
Third, the cloud will average the weights of all the
clients. Thus, the averaged weights of the allied clas-
sifiers must also hold an honest majority. Since the
adversary does not have access to the weights of the
honest clients, we can approximate it by averaging
the honest weights of the malicious clients. Let wc
be the weights of the client c; then equation 6 ex-
presses the clients constraint.
1
N + 1
N∑
c=1
b∑
i=1
(wci + w
′
i) > 0.5, {i | i ∈M > 0.5}
(6)
Finally, the cloud will compute the federated
weights by averaging its own weights with the average
of the clients. Assuming the weights of the cloud are
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known, we can make the same honest majority across
allied classifiers to hold by approximating it with the
guessed average in equation 6. Let w∗ be these av-
eraged weights and wcloud, the weights of the cloud;
then equation 7 expresses the cloud constraint.
1
2
b∑
i=1
(wcloudi + w
∗
i ) > 0.5, {i | i ∈M > 0.5}, (7)
Each round, the adversary will try to solve this
problem and submit the poisoned weights. If no so-
lution is found, then he relaxes the problem by first
dropping the cloud constraint, and then the client
constraint. The adversary will always find a way to
meet the local constraint.
All malicious clients install the same app targeted
by the adversary. To bound the chances of success,
we assume the app is crafted so that there is at least
one allied base learner, and ensuring their cumulative
weights lie between 0.3 and 0.4. This range makes it
possible for the adversary to win, but assumes he can-
not make an app that is misclassified by the weighted
majority of base learners.
We compare how LiM gets affected by the attack
under different configurations of learners.
Table 4 shows that poisoning has virtually no ef-
fect in the LiM cloud when using KNN as baseline
(F1 score always around 96%). However, configu-
rations with baselines LR and SVM see their perfor-
mance drop with respect to SAFEW. It turns out the
adversary is able to poison the honest clients using
SVM as baseline every second round, causing the F1
score of the cloud to jump between 95.3% and 96.2%.
We did not observe a stabilization in either direction
during the 50 rounds of our simulations. In the case
of baseline LR, clients perform slightly worse than
SAFEW in the initial rounds, but the average differ-
ence between F1 scores of LiM clients and SAFEWs
drops as rounds advance. This makes the cloud per-
form slightly worse on average, but reach almost the
same score by round 50 (96.1%).
Table 5 compares the average client performance
for honest LiM clients with baseline, SAFEW and ad-
versarial (i.e. poisoned) clients. Clients using a base-
line SVM with 200 features drop their performance
with respect to baseline, due to their average F1 score
jumping from 0.2 to 0.6 every other round. Interest-
ingly, as rounds advance, the success of the poisoning
diminishes as the clients grow their F1 scores. When
LR is used as baseline, the average performance of
the LiM clients is lower than SAFEW, but as rounds
advance it converges towards the same SAFEW 80%
F1 score (last round).
We now look into the evolution of LiM clients us-
ing kNN as baseline classifier, as it is the one that
still improves its performance with respect to base-
line and SAFEW. Figure 4 shows clients improve over
time and is able to perform better than baseline even
though SAFEW does not. It also shows how the
F1 score of the adversarial clients approximates the
worst among the three, suggesting that the adversary
is indeed poisoning LiM so that the submitted param-
eters are close to a potential honest set of parameters.
Figure 4: F1 score of 100 honest + 100 malicious
clients, using 200 features with baseline kNN (n=3).
SAFEW (i.e. no-lim) improves on baseline, and LiM
improves on SAFEW.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the false positives.
Since the adversary only wants to trigger a false neg-
ative, the number of false positives in adversarial
clients can indeed be minimized to behave as close
to an honest client as possible.
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Table 4: Comparison of cloud average performance across LiM, SAFEW, Centralized SAFEW and different
baselines when 50% of the clients are adversarial. Experiments are carried out for 50 rounds of federation
using the top 100, top 200 and top 500 features as per the chi2 test.
FP F1 (%)
Classifier Baseline Centralized SAFEW LiM SAFEW Baseline Centralized SAFEW LiM SAFEW
Baseline #features
KNN n3 100 1037 660 659 660 94.6 95.9 95.9 95.9
200 1000 624 620 622 95.0 96.3 96.3 96.3
500 856 508 507 503 95.3 96.5 96.5 96.5
LR c1 100 1046 735 731 731 94.2 95.7 95.7 95.7
200 835 781 777 611 94.4 95.6 95.6 96.2
500 733 591 591 561 95.0 96.2 96.2 96.3
SVM c1 100 951 823 820 755 94.1 95.4 95.4 95.7
200 763 785 781 648 94.7 95.6 95.6 96.1
500 635 724 722 622 95.4 95.9 96.0 96.2
Table 5: Comparison of client average performance across LiM, SAFEW and different baselines when 50%
of the clients are adversarial. Experiments are carried out for 50 rounds of federation using the top 100, top
200 and top 500 features as per the chi2 test.
FP F1 (%)
Classifier Baseline LiM SAFEW Adv. client Baseline LiM SAFEW Adv. client
Baseline #features
KNN n3 100 10 2 5 2 31.1 66.4 52.1 33.6
200 5 2 7 4 48.0 66.3 39.9 31.1
500 7 2 5 3 37.1 54.0 48.3 17.9
LR c1 100 5 4 5 8 44.7 46.3 44.6 23.4
200 3 2 2 8 62.5 71.3 75.0 33.1
500 4 3 3 6 56.7 60.4 60.4 26.9
SVM c1 100 5 4 4 8 45.2 54.8 54.8 26.7
200 3 5 10 7 60.3 52.4 36.1 27.1
500 3 4 6 7 59.6 56.1 46.9 24.2
7 Discussion and future work
The evaluation results show that LiM can enable
clients to learn from each other without users pro-
viding ground truth. The selection of learners for the
individual SAFEWs proves to be an important task
to carry out in order to reach this goal, as results vary
accordingly to the strength of the individual learners
and the variance across their predictions. We observe
that random forests provide high F1 score by them-
selves, but LiM can outperform them by fine tun-
ing the weights of weaker but complementary learn-
ers, as explained in section 5. The best results were
achieved when all learners influenced the final pre-
dictions, without copying those of for e.g. a random
forest. Even though we used standard simple learn-
ers to focus on the federation itself, we expect LiM
to greatly benefit from domain knowledge insights
regarding the use of specific algorithms and architec-
tures. Future work is needed to verify this hypothesis,
possibly in other domains where users cannot provide
ground truth themselves.
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Figure 5: False positives of 200 clients with 200 fea-
tures, using kNN (n=3) as base learner.
Our results also suggest that using relatively few
features can provide better performance, rather than
making use of large feature sets. While 100 features
seem to be insufficient for LiM to perform well, we
see that 200 is equal or sometimes better than using
500 features. While this type of data minimization is
considered irrelevant when clients do not share their
testing samples, it benefits both runtime performance
and resilience against privacy attacks, which can ex-
ploit the sparseness of the shared models with respect
to the training samples.
Regarding performance results, we highlight that
1) the cloud LiM matches and sometimes outper-
forms a privacy-invasive Centralized SAFEW (as well
as multiple baseline classifiers), i.e. LiM does not
sacrifice performance for privacy, and 2) clients can
greatly reduce the number of false positives thanks to
the federation rounds. The drastic improvement gain
in the first round of federation and contribution of the
client weights towards the weights of the cloud leads
us to believe that increasing the number of clients in
the simulations may reproduce this effect along fur-
ther rounds, as there will be more information com-
ing from the averaged client weights. Simulating LiM
at scale can help clarify the relationship between the
number of clients and LiM performance.
Interestingly, LiM can avoid virtually any privacy
loss with respect to a centralized SAFEW as the
federation of the clients provides enough informa-
tion to arrive to the same weights of the privacy-
invasive model. Even though the differences between
the weights of the cloud without federation and the
weights of the centralized SAFEW can be relatively
high (e.g. to 0.1 in a single weight, 0.37 vs 0.47),
clients can provide enough information to equalize
them.
We envision LiM as a system that can be prac-
tically deployed in real-world smartphones. While
market interests may dissuade powerful organizations
like Google to deploy LiM in stock Android, we be-
lieve third-party ROMs differentiating themselves by
being more privacy conscious (e.g. /e/1) can develop
the client app as a privileged service executed upon
the installation of (one or more) apps. This practi-
cal implementation would be able to perform static
analysis over the manifest files of the newly installed
apps, while trusting a neutral LiM service provider
with the resulting client models.
Limitations & Future work: We expect future
work to address the following limitations of the cur-
rent formulation of LiM, namely:
• Malware family-wise classification is out of the
scope in this paper. Our figures do not take into
account the specific characteristics of the mal-
ware apps installed by clients.
• Conducted an extended analysis to study the
evolution of LiM with different data distribu-
tions among cloud and clients models. We only
simulate 50 rounds of federation with a static
set of users installing apps and pre-defined pa-
rameters to simulate probabilities of installing
malware, clean and popular apps.
We believe LiM is equipped to act as a self-evolving
system that requires a very low maintenance over-
head for the service provider, benefitting from the
ever-enlarging set of apps users install on their de-
vices and the geographic distribution of malware to
prevent malware to disseminate in large numbers.
1https://e.foundation/
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8 Related work
8.1 Machine learning for Android
malware classification
ML techniques to detect mobile malware have been
extensively investigated, leveraging a few character-
istics of the mobile applications (for example, call
graphs [23], permissions [16], or both API calls
and permissions [14]), and the results obtained were
promising. Classification approaches have also been
proposed to model and approximate the behaviors of
Android applications and discern malicious apps from
benign ones. The detection accuracy of a classifica-
tion method depends on the quality of the features
(for example, how specific the features are [25]).
In [22], Milosevic et al. implemented an app that
detects malware locally through a pre-trained SVM
classifier. They explicitly created a permission based
model to detect malware. There is no informa-
tion to recreate the model, although the model it-
self is available as part of the OWASP Seraphimdroid
project [30]. The dataset they used has 200 benign
and 200 malicious apps; however, since 2015, their
dataset is no longer publicly available. For more re-
cent state of the art related work in this area, we refer
the reader to [29].
8.1.1 Feature minimization
In general, classification models perform better when
an abundance of data is available for training. How-
ever, more data often means additional noise intro-
duced in the model and more importantly, sensi-
tive information can be inferred from the dataset,
as shown in [26, 35]. Additionally, there are several
work on feature selection that shows that choosing
a selected set of features that are most representa-
tive of the dataset can provide better accuracy [25].
The downside with this approach, however, is that
the signature database needs to be updated on a reg-
ular basis – this downside is addressed in our pro-
posed classifier, LiM. Karbab et al. [13] generate a
fingerprint based on three different sub-fingerprints,
and uses it to detect if the APK has malicious pay-
load belonging to a certain family. One of the sub-
fingerprints is the metadata fingerprint, which relies
mostly on permission lists. They encode this finger-
print in a vector of 256 bits, each bit corresponding
to one Android permission. They do not detect app
IDs though, but only detect malware families. Pan
et al. [31] show apps hog permissions without neces-
sarily using them.
8.2 Federated learning
McMahan et al. [20] proposed federated learning as a
way to distribute the training process of a deep neu-
ral network. This distribution allows users to keep
data in their devices while a service provider aggre-
gates and distributes the locally trained model across
users, minimizing the amount of data collected by
third parties about users.
One of the challenges of FL is to ensure that an ad-
versary does not tamper with the training samples,
i.e. by adding perturbed data into the model to trig-
ger a misclassification [5]. Such an attack fall under
the category of poisoning attack. In [6], Biggio et al.
presented one of the early works about the impact
of poisoning attack on malware clustering. They be-
gan by proposing an open-source malware clustering
tool. To demonstrate its effectiveness, they imitated
an attacker who is able to add crafted, poisoning sam-
ples with the goal of downgrading the proposed’s tool
performance. Chen et al [9] conducted a more exten-
sive study on poisoning attack strategies where they
considered two different types of threat models, and
demonstrated how an adversary can successfully in-
troduce poisoned data into a neural network.
9 Conclusion
We have presented LiM, the first federated learning
algorithm that works successfully without user super-
vision, making use of safe semi-supervised learning
techniques. We demonstrate its utility as a malware
detection system where users keep their apps secret
from the service provider while detecting most of the
malicious apps they install without raising many false
alarms.
LiM is resistant against a strategic adversary that
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crafts a malicious app in order to bypass the detec-
tion mechanism and compromises 50% of the clients.
Thanks to the greater role of the service provider,
LiM can defend against this attack while keeping its
overall performance intact.
While we carried out its evaluation in the malware
detection domain, LiM can be potentially applied to
any problem where users cannot provide ground truth
labels to the clients models, but would still bene-
fit from the performance improvements of federated
learning and its privacy properties.
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A List of features
A.1 Top 100 features
• android hardware camera
• android hardware camera autofocus
• android hardware microphone
• android hardware screen landscape
• android hardware screen portrait
• android hardware touchscreen multitouch
• android hardware touchscreen multitouch distinct
• android hardware wifi
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• android permission access assisted gps
• android permission access coarse location
• android permission access coarse updates
• android permission access fine location
• android permission access gps
• android permission access location
• android permission access location extra commands
• android permission access wifi state
• android permission call phone
• android permission change wifi state
• android permission get tasks
• android permission install packages
• android permission kill background processes
• android permission mount unmount filesystems
• android permission process outgoing calls
• android permission read call log
• android permission read contacts
• android permission read logs
• android permission read phone state
• android permission read profile
• android permission read settings
• android permission read sms
• android permission receive boot completed
• android permission receive sms
• android permission restart packages
• android permission send sms
• android permission system alert window
• android permission use credentials
• android permission write apn settings
• android permission write contacts
• android permission write external storage
• android permission write settings
• android permission write sms
• android support v4 content fileprovider
• cn domob android ads domobactivity
• com adfeiwo ad coverscreen sa
• com adfeiwo ad coverscreen sr
• com adfeiwo ad coverscreen wa
• com adwo adsdk adwoadbrowseractivity
• com airpush android deliveryreceiver
• com airpush android messagereceiver
• com airpush android pushads
• com airpush android pushservice
• com airpush android userdetailsreceiver
• com android browser permission read history bookmarks
• com android browser permission write history bookmarks
• com android launcher permission install shortcut
• com android launcher permission uninstall shortcut
• com android vending billing
• com bving img ag
• com bving img rv
• com bving img se
• com facebook ads interstitialadactivity
• com facebook facebookactivity
• com facebook loginactivity
• com google android c2dm permission receive
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• com google android gms ads adactivity
• com google android gms ads purchase inapppurchaseactivity
• com google android gms analytics analyticsreceiver
• com google android gms analytics analyticsservice
• com google android gms analytics campaigntrackingreceiver
• com google android gms analytics campaigntrackingservice
• com google android gms appinvite previewactivity
• com google android gms auth api signin internal signinhubactivity
• com google android gms auth api signin revocationboundservice
• com google android gms common api googleapiactivity
• com google android gms gcm gcmreceiver
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementcontentprovider
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementinstallreferrerreceiver
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementreceiver
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementservice
• com google android providers gsf permission read gservices
• com google firebase iid firebaseinstanceidinternalreceiver
• com google firebase iid firebaseinstanceidreceiver
• com google firebase iid firebaseinstanceidservice
• com google firebase messaging firebasemessagingservice
• com google firebase provider firebaseinitprovider
• com google update dialog
• com google update receiver
• com google update updateservice
• com kuguo ad boutiqueactivity
• com kuguo ad mainactivity
• com kuguo ad mainreceiver
• com kuguo ad mainservice
• com mobclix android sdk mobclixbrowseractivity
• com soft android appinstaller finishactivity
• com soft android appinstaller firstactivity
• com soft android appinstaller rulesactivity
• com soft android appinstaller memberactivity
• com soft android appinstaller questionactivity
• com startapp android publish appwallactivity
• net youmi android adactivity
A.2 Top 200 features
• android hardware camera
• android hardware camera autofocus
• android hardware camera front
• android hardware microphone
• android hardware screen landscape
• android hardware screen portrait
• android hardware touchscreen multitouch
• android hardware touchscreen multitouch distinct
• android hardware wifi
• android permission access assisted gps
• android permission access coarse location
• android permission access coarse updates
• android permission access fine location
• android permission access gps
• android permission access location
• android permission access location extra commands
• android permission access wifi state
• android permission call phone
• android permission camera
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• android permission change configuration
• android permission change network state
• android permission change wifi state
• android permission clear app cache
• android permission get tasks
• android permission install packages
• android permission kill background processes
• android permission mount unmount filesystems
• android permission process outgoing calls
• android permission read calendar
• android permission read call log
• android permission read contacts
• android permission read external storage
• android permission read logs
• android permission read phone state
• android permission read profile
• android permission read settings
• android permission read sms
• android permission receive boot completed
• android permission receive sms
• android permission receive wap push
• android permission record audio
• android permission restart packages
• android permission send sms
• android permission system alert window
• android permission use credentials
• android permission vibrate
• android permission write apn settings
• android permission write calendar
• android permission write contacts
• android permission write external storage
• android permission write settings
• android permission write sms
• android support v4 content fileprovider
• biz neoline android reader bookmarksandtocactivity
• biz neoline android reader libraryactivity
• biz neoline android reader neobookreader
• biz neoline android reader textsearchactivity
• biz neoline app core core application shutdownreceiver
• biz neoline app core ui android dialogs dialogactivity
• biz neoline app core ui android library crashreportingactivity
• biz neoline test donationactivity
• cn domob android ads domobactivity
• com adfeiwo ad coverscreen sa
• com adfeiwo ad coverscreen sr
• com adfeiwo ad coverscreen wa
• com adwo adsdk adwoadbrowseractivity
• com adwo adsdk adwosplashadactivity
• com airpush android deliveryreceiver
• com airpush android messagereceiver
• com airpush android pushads
• com airpush android pushservice
• com airpush android smartwallactivity
• com airpush android userdetailsreceiver
• com amazon device messaging permission receive
• com anddoes launcher permission update count
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• com android browser permission read history bookmarks
• com android browser permission write history bookmarks
• com android launcher permission install shortcut
• com android launcher permission uninstall shortcut
• com android vending billing
• com biznessapps layout maincontroller
• com biznessapps player playerservice
• com biznessapps pushnotifications c2dmmessagesreceiver
• com biznessapps pushnotifications c2dmregistrationreceiver
• com bving img ag
• com bving img rv
• com bving img se
• com chartboost sdk cbimpressionactivity
• com elm lma
• com elm lmr
• com elm lms
• com elm lmsk
• com facebook ads audiencenetworkactivity
• com facebook ads interstitialadactivity
• com facebook customtabactivity
• com facebook customtabmainactivity
• com facebook facebookactivity
• com facebook facebookcontentprovider
• com facebook loginactivity
• com feiwothree coverscreen sa
• com feiwothree coverscreen sr
• com feiwothree coverscreen wa
• com google android apps analytics analyticsreceiver
• com google android c2dm permission receive
• com google android gcm gcmbroadcastreceiver
• com google android gms ads adactivity
• com google android gms ads purchase inapppurchaseactivity
• com google android gms analytics analyticsreceiver
• com google android gms analytics analyticsservice
• com google android gms analytics campaigntrackingreceiver
• com google android gms analytics campaigntrackingservice
• com google android gms appinvite previewactivity
• com google android gms auth api signin internal signinhubactivity
• com google android gms auth api signin revocationboundservice
• com google android gms common api googleapiactivity
• com google android gms gcm gcmreceiver
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementcontentprovider
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementinstallreferrerreceiver
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementjobservice
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementreceiver
• com google android gms measurement appmeasurementservice
• com google android providers gsf permission read gservices
• com google firebase iid firebaseinstanceidinternalreceiver
• com google firebase iid firebaseinstanceidreceiver
• com google firebase iid firebaseinstanceidservice
• com google firebase messaging firebasemessagingservice
• com google firebase provider firebaseinitprovider
• com google update dialog
• com google update receiver
• com google update updateservice
• com htc launcher permission update shortcut
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• com klpcjg wyxjvs102320 browseractivity
• com klpcjg wyxjvs102320 mainactivity
• com klpcjg wyxjvs102320 vdactivity
• com kuguo ad boutiqueactivity
• com kuguo ad mainactivity
• com kuguo ad mainreceiver
• com kuguo ad mainservice
• com majeur launcher permission update badge
• com mobclix android sdk mobclixbrowseractivity
• com nd dianjin activity offerappactivity
• com onesignal gcmbroadcastreceiver
• com onesignal gcmintentservice
• com onesignal notificationopenedreceiver
• com onesignal permissionsactivity
• com onesignal syncservice
• com parse gcmbroadcastreceiver
• com parse parsebroadcastreceiver
• com parse pushservice
• com paypal android sdk payments futurepaymentconsentactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments futurepaymentinfoactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments loginactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments paymentactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments paymentconfirmactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments paymentmethodactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments paypalfuturepaymentactivity
• com paypal android sdk payments paypalservice
• com sec android provider badge permission read
• com sec android provider badge permission write
• com soft android appinstaller finishactivity
• com soft android appinstaller firstactivity
• com soft android appinstaller rulesactivity
• com soft android appinstaller services smssenderservice
• com soft android appinstaller sms binarysmsreceiver
• com soft android appinstaller memberactivity
• com soft android appinstaller questionactivity
• com software application c2dmreceiver
• com software application checker
• com software application main
• com software application notificator
• com software application offertactivity
• com software application showlink
• com software application smsreceiver
• com software application permission c2d message
• com sonyericsson home permission broadcast badge
• com sonymobile home permission provider insert badge
• com startapp android publish appwallactivity
• com startapp android publish fullscreenactivity
• om startapp android publish overlayactivity
• com tencent mobwin mobinwinbrowseractivity
• com umeng common net downloadingservice
• com uniplugin sender areceiver
• com unity3d ads android view unityadsfullscreenactivity
• com unity3d player unityplayeractivity
• com unity3d player unityplayernativeactivity
• com urbanairship corereceiver
• com urbanairship push pushservice
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• com vpon adon android webinapp
• com waps offerswebview
• io card payment cardioactivity
• io card payment dataentryactivity
• net youmi android adactivity
• net youmi android adbrowser
• net youmi android adreceiver
• net youmi android adservice
• net youmi android appoffers youmioffersactivity
• net youmi android youmireceiver
• tk jianmo study bootbroadcastreceiver
• tk jianmo study killpoccessserve
• tk jianmo study mainactivity
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